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H.R. 3454 · Protecting Our Constitution and Communities Act ·

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Sections are cited like “7 U.S.C. § 2012”: 7 of the , 2012.

2 U.S.C. § 681 Disclaimer

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    Section 1001 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 681) is amended to read as follows:1001. Findings and intent of Congress (a) Findings.— Congress finds the following: (1) Article I of the Constitution of the United States vests the legislative power, and particularly the exclusive power of the purse, in Congress. (2) Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution of …

§ 681(a)–(4)

§ 681. [struck: Disclaimer][inserted: Findings and intent of Congress]

(a) [inserted: Findings.—] [inserted: Congress finds the following:]

(1) [inserted: Article I of the Constitution of the United States vests the legislative power, and particularly the exclusive power of the purse, in Congress.]

(2) [inserted: Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution of the United States vests the executive power in the President subject to the express obligation that the President take care that the laws be faithfully executed, including those laws by which Congress exercises its Article I power of the purse.]

(3) [inserted: Congress alone has the constitutional power to appropriate funds, and the President has the obligation to faithfully execute those laws and to obligate as well as expend funds that have been lawfully appropriated.]

(4) [inserted: Constitutional scholars and practitioners agree that appropriations place both a “ceiling” and a “floor” on executive spending. As later Chief Justice, then-Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel, William H. Rehnquist affirmed, there is “neither reason nor precedent” for the President to have “a constitutional power to decline to spend appropriated funds.” W.H. Rehnquist, Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally Impacted Schools, 1 Op. O.L.C. 303309 (1969). While serving as Associate White House Counsel, current Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. acknowledged that “no area seems more clearly the province of Congress than the power of the purse.” Memorandum from John G. Roberts, Jr., for Fred F. Fielding on Impoundment Authority (August 15, 1985).]

(5) [inserted: This understanding was demonstrated by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which was enacted as soon as claims of constitutional authority for impoundment threatened to upset historical practice.]

(6) [inserted: This Act thereby codifies the longstanding separation-of-powers principle that the President has no constitutional authority to impound funds that Congress has already appropriated for a particular policy purpose. After the President signed the Act into law, subsequent practice has continued to confirm this separation-of-powers understanding among the branches.]

(7) [inserted: The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “[t]o contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.” Kendall v. United States ex Rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 525 (1838). More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that where “legislation was intended to provide a firm commitment of substantial sums . . . . [w]e cannot believe that Congress . . . scuttled the entire effort by providing the Executive with the seemingly limitless power to withhold funds from allotment and obligation.” Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45 (1975). As later Justice, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote in In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 261 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013), “[e]ven the president does not have unilateral authority to refuse to spend the funds.”.]

(8) [inserted: When taking measures that are incompatible with the will of Congress, the President’s power is at its lowest ebb in an area where the President has no plenary constitutional powers, and Congress’ powers are plenary. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 673 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). The President therefore has no constitutional authority to impound appropriated funds contrary to the express will of Congress.]

(9) [inserted: Interpretation of this Act and compliance with its provisions is a legal question within the purview of Article III courts and not a political question.]

(10) [inserted: When the Executive fails to release funds following a lawful withholding under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 or fails to obligate or expend funds that have been appropriated by Congress, private parties experience a particularized and immediate injury.]

(b) [inserted: Disclaimer.—] [inserted: Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made by this Act, shall be construed as—]

(1) [inserted: asserting or conceding the constitutional powers or limitations of either the Congress or the President;]

(2) [inserted: ratifying or approving any impoundment heretofore or hereafter executed or approved by the President or any other Federal officer or employee, except insofar as pursuant to statutory authorization then in effect;]

(3) [inserted: superseding any provision of law which requires the obligation of budget authority or the making of outlays thereunder; or]

(4) [inserted: to prevent adjudication on the merits by Article III courts of claims related to failures to obligate or expend budget authority.]

(c) [inserted: Sense of Congress.—] [inserted: It is the sense of Congress that the only mechanisms by which the President is allowed to fail to obligate or expend funds provided by law are those provided under sections 1012 and 1013 of this Act.]

[struck: Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made by this Act, shall be construed as—]

[struck: (1)] [struck: asserting or conceding the constitutional powers or limitations of either the Congress or the President;]

[struck: (2)] [struck: ratifying or approving any impoundment heretofore or hereafter executed or approved by the President or any other Federal officer or employee, except insofar as pursuant to statutory authorization then in effect;]

[struck: (3)] [struck: affecting in any way the claims or defenses of any party to litigation concerning any impoundment; or]

[struck: (4)] [struck: superseding any provision of law which requires the obligation of budget authority or the making of outlays thereunder.]

2 U.S.C. § 682 Definitions

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  1. Carried out:

    in paragraph (4), by striking and at the end;

  2. Carried out:

    in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and inserting ; and; and

  3. Carried out:

    by adding at the end the following new paragraph:(6) “contingencies” means unforeseen events or circumstances that could not have been reasonably anticipated, which necessitate immediate and temporary adjustments due to urgent and demonstrable needs, where such action is consistent with statutory and constitutional limitations on executive budgetary authority..

§ 682(3)–(6)

Start of § 682 to (2) unchanged ·

(3) “rescission bill” means a bill or joint resolution which only rescinds, in whole or in part, budget authority proposed to be rescinded in a special message transmitted by the President under section 683 of this title, and upon which the Congress completes action before the end of the first period of 45 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on which the President’s message is received by the Congress;

(4) “impoundment resolution” means a resolution of the House of Representatives or the Senate which only expresses its disapproval of a proposed deferral of budget authority set forth in a special message transmitted by the President under section 684 of this title;[struck: and]

(5) continuity of a session of the Congress shall be considered as broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of the 45-day period referred to in paragraph (3) of this section and in section 683 of this title, and the 25-day periods referred to in sections 687 and 688(b)(1) of this title. If a special message is transmitted under section 683 of this title during any Congress and the last session of such Congress adjourns sine die before the expiration of 45 calendar days of continuous session (or a special message is so transmitted after the last session of the Congress adjourns sine die), the message shall be deemed to have been retransmitted on the first day of the succeeding Congress and the 45-day period referred to in paragraph (3) of this section and in section 683 of this title (with respect to such message) shall commence on the day after such first day[struck: .][inserted: ; and]

(6) [inserted: “contingencies” means unforeseen events or circumstances that could not have been reasonably anticipated, which necessitate immediate and temporary adjustments due to urgent and demonstrable needs, where such action is consistent with statutory and constitutional limitations on executive budgetary authority.]

2 U.S.C. § 686 Reports by Comptroller General

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  1. Carried out:

    Section 1015 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 686) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:(c) Legal interpretation of Comptroller General.— In any determination regarding applicability or enforcement of sections 1001 through 1015, the legal interpretation of the Comptroller General of the United States, acting through the Government Accountability Office, shall be …

§ 686(a)–(e)

Start of § 686 to (a)(2) unchanged ·

and that the President has failed to transmit a special message with respect to such reserve or deferral, the Comptroller General shall make a report on such reserve or deferral and any available information concerning it to both Houses of Congress. The provisions of sections 682 to 688 of this title shall apply with respect to such reserve or deferral in the same manner and with the same effect as if such report of the Comptroller General were a special message transmitted by the President under section 683 or 684 of this title, and, for purposes of sections 682 to 688 of this title, such report shall be considered a special message transmitted under section 683 or 684 of this title.

(b) Incorrect classification of special message If the President has transmitted a special message to both Houses of Congress in accordance with section 683 or 684 of this title, and the Comptroller General believes that the President so transmitted the special message in accordance with one of those sections when the special message should have been transmitted in accordance with the other of those sections, the Comptroller General shall make a report to both Houses of the Congress setting forth his reasons.

(c) [inserted: Legal interpretation of Comptroller General.—] [inserted: In any determination regarding applicability or enforcement of sections 1001 through 1015, the legal interpretation of the Comptroller General of the United States, acting through the Government Accountability Office, shall be accorded substantial deference.]

(d) [inserted: Executive Branch assistance.—] [inserted: The Executive Branch shall provide timely access to all necessary and appropriate records and information to facilitate the Comptroller General’s review of potential violations of the Act.]

(e) [inserted: Reports to Congress.—] [inserted: Any failure to comply with the Comptroller General’s determination regarding an impoundment shall be reported to Congress for appropriate legislative or judicial action.]

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