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H.R. 8286 · Protecting Americans’ Retirement Savings From Politics Act ·

Reported by committee · step 2 of 5

Sections are cited like “7 U.S.C. § 2012”: 7 of the , 2012.

15 U.S.C. § 77b Definitions; promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation

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    in the subsection heading, by inserting ; Limitation on Disclosure Requirements after Formation;

    “Formation” isn't in § 77b(b) in the Code as we have it. The law may have changed since the bill was drafted.

    Technical detail“Formation” not found in /us/usc/t15/s77b/b
  2. Carried out:

    by striking Whenever and inserting the following:(1) In general.— Whenever; and

  3. Carried out:

    by adding at the end the following:(2) Limitation.— (A) In general.— Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure …

§ 77b(a)–(b)

Start of § 77b to (a)(19)(C) unchanged ·

(D) the date on which such issuer is deemed to be a “large accelerated filer”, as defined in section 240.12b–2 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto.

(b) Consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation

(1) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.]

(2) [inserted: Limitation.—]

(A) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of such issuer.]

(B) [inserted: Applicability.—] [inserted: Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the removal of any disclosure requirement with respect to an issuer.]

(C) [inserted: Rule of construction.—] [inserted: For the purposes of this paragraph, information is considered material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of an issuer if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the failure to disclose that information as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available to the investor.]

[struck: Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.]

15 U.S.C. § 78c Definitions and application

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  1. Not carried out:

    in the subsection heading, by inserting ; Limitation on Disclosure Requirements after Formation;

    “Formation” isn't in § 78c(f) in the Code as we have it. The law may have changed since the bill was drafted.

    Technical detail“Formation” not found in /us/usc/t15/s78c/f
  2. Carried out:

    by striking Whenever and inserting the following:(1) In general.— Whenever; and

  3. Carried out:

    by adding at the end the following:(2) Limitation.— (A) In general.— Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure …

  4. Carried out:

    by redesignating the second paragraph (80) (relating to funding portal) as paragraph (81); and

  5. Carried out:

    by adding at the end the following:(82) Proxy advisory firm.— The term “proxy advisory firm”— (A) means any person that— (i) makes a recommendation to a security holder as to the security holder’s vote, consent, or authorization on a specific matter for which security holder approval is solicited; (ii) markets …

§ 78c(a)–(c)

Start of § 78c to (a)(80)(B) unchanged ·

(C) the date on which such issuer has, during the previous 3-year period, issued more than $1,000,000,000 in non-convertible debt; or

(D) the date on which such issuer is deemed to be a “large accelerated filer”, as defined in section 240.12b–2 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto.

[struck: (80)] [inserted: (81)] 7 Funding portal.— The term “funding portal” means any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to section 4(6) 1 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(6)), that does not—

(A) offer investment advice or recommendations;

(B) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or displayed on its website or portal;

(C) compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based on the sale of securities displayed or referenced on its website or portal;

(D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or

(E) engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines appropriate.

(82) [inserted: Proxy advisory firm.—] [inserted: The term “proxy advisory firm”—]

(A) [inserted: means any person that—]

(i) [inserted: makes a recommendation to a security holder as to the security holder’s vote, consent, or authorization on a specific matter for which security holder approval is solicited;]

(ii) [inserted: markets the person’s expertise as a provider of such proxy voting advice separately from other forms of investment advice; and]

(iii) [inserted: sells such proxy voting advice for a fee; and]

(B) [inserted: does not include—]

(i) [inserted: a registered investment adviser; or]

(ii) [inserted: any person that is exempt under law or regulation from the requirements otherwise applicable to persons engaged in such a solicitation.]

(83) [inserted: Person associated with a proxy advisory firm.—] [inserted: With respect to a proxy advisory firm—]

(A) [inserted: a person is “associated” with the proxy advisory firm if the person is—]

(i) [inserted: a partner, officer, or director of the proxy advisory firm (or any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions);]

(ii) [inserted: a person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the proxy advisory firm;]

(iii) [inserted: an employee of the proxy advisory firm; or]

(iv) [inserted: a person the Commission determines by rule is controlled by the proxy advisory firm; and]

(B) [inserted: a person is not “associated” with the proxy advisory firm if the person only performs clerical or ministerial functions with respect to a proxy advisory firm.]

(b) Power to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms The Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as to matters within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power by rules and regulations to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms used in this chapter, consistently with the provisions and purposes of this chapter.

(c) Application to governmental departments or agencies No provision of this chapter shall apply to, or be deemed to include, any executive department or independent establishment of the United States, or any lending agency which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States, or any officer, agent, or employee of any such department, establishment, or agency, acting in the course of his official duty as such, unless such provision makes specific reference to such department, establishment, or agency.

§ 78c(e)–(g)

(d)–(e) unchanged ·

(2) Limitation on compensation The exemption provided under paragraph (1) shall not be available to any charitable organization, or any trustee, director, officer, employee, or volunteer of such a charitable organization, unless each person who, on or after 90 days after December 8, 1995, solicits donations on behalf of such charitable organization from any donor to a fund that is excluded from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(10)(B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a–3(c)(10)(B)], is either a volunteer or is engaged in the overall fund raising activities of a charitable organization and receives no commission or other special compensation based on the number or the value of donations collected for the fund.

(f) Consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation

(1) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking, or in the review of a rule of a self-regulatory organization, and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.]

(2) [inserted: Limitation.—]

(A) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking regarding disclosure obligations of issuers, the Commission shall expressly provide that an issuer is only required to disclose information in response to such disclosure obligations to the extent the issuer has determined that such information is material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of such issuer.]

(B) [inserted: Applicability.—] [inserted: Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the removal of any disclosure requirement with respect to an issuer.]

(C) [inserted: Rule of construction.—] [inserted: For the purposes of this paragraph, information is considered material with respect to a voting or investment decision regarding the securities of an issuer if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the failure to disclose that information as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available to the investor.]

[struck: Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking, or in the review of a rule of a self-regulatory organization, and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.]

(g) Church plans No church plan described in section 414(e) of title 26, no person or entity eligible to establish and maintain such a plan under title 26, no company or account that is excluded from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(14) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a–3(c)(14)], and no trustee, director, officer or employee of or volunteer for such plan, company, account, person, or entity, acting within the scope of that person’s employment or activities with respect to such plan, shall be deemed to be a “broker”, “dealer”, “municipal securities broker”, “municipal securities dealer”, “government securities broker”, “government securities dealer”, “clearing agency”, or “transfer agent” for purposes of this chapter—

(1) solely because such plan, company, person, or entity buys, holds, sells, trades in, or transfers securities or acts as an intermediary in making payments in connection with transactions in securities for its own account in its capacity as trustee or administrator of, or otherwise on behalf of, or for the account of, any church plan, company, or account that is excluded from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(14) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a–3(c)(14)]; and

Rest of § 78c unchanged ·

15 U.S.C. § 78d Securities and Exchange Commission

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  1. Carried out:

    Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78d) is amended by adding at the end the following:(k) Study of certain issues with respect to proxy advisory firms and the proxy process.— (1) In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall conduct a comprehensive study on proxy …

§ 78d(j)–(k)

Start of § 78d to (j)(2) unchanged ·

(3) rendered in a human-readable format; and

(4) accessible via application programming interface where appropriate.

(k) [inserted: Study of certain issues with respect to proxy advisory firms and the proxy process.—]

(1) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall conduct a comprehensive study on proxy advisory firms and the proxy process.]

(2) [inserted: Scope of study.—] [inserted: The studies required under paragraph (1) shall cover—]

(A) [inserted: the previous 10 years, with respect to the initial study; and]

(B) [inserted: the previous 5 years, with respect to each other study.]

(3) [inserted: Contents.—] [inserted: Each study required under paragraph (1) shall address the following issues:]

(A) [inserted: The financial and other incentives and obligations of all groups involved in the proxy process.]

(B) [inserted: A consideration of whether financial and other incentives have created a process that no longer serves the economic interests of retail investors.]

(C) [inserted: An analysis of whether regulations and financial incentives have created and protected the outsized influence of proxy advisors or a duopoly in proxy advice, and if so, what are the benefits and costs of that outsized influence or duopoly.]

(D) [inserted: The costs incurred by issuers in responding to politically-, environmentally-, or socially-motivated shareholder proposals.]

(E) [inserted: An analysis of the impact that shareholder proposals have on discouraging private companies from going public.]

(F) [inserted: A thorough assessment of the economic analysis, if any, conducted by proxy advisory firms and institutional shareholders when recommending or voting in favor of shareholder proposals.]

(G) [inserted: A review of the extent to which institutional investors, who owe fiduciary duties, rely on proxy advisory firm recommendations.]

(H) [inserted: An assessment of whether, in light of their significant influence on corporate actions and vote outcomes, proxy advisors are subject to sufficient and effective regulation to ensure that their policies and recommendations are accurate, free of conflicts, and benefit the best economic interest of shareholders at large.]

(4) [inserted: Report.—] [inserted: At the completion of each study required under paragraph (1), the Commission shall issue a report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that includes the results of the study.]

15 U.S.C. § 78m Periodical and other reports

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    Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(f)) is amended by adding at the end the following:(7) Disclosures by institutional investment managers in connection with proxy advisory firms.— (A) In general.— Every institutional investment manager which uses the mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in the course of its business as an institutional …

§ 78m(f)–(g)

Start of § 78m to (f)(6) unchanged ·

(A) For purposes of this subsection the term “institutional investment manager” includes any person, other than a natural person, investing in or buying and selling securities for its own account, and any person exercising investment discretion with respect to the account of any other person.

(B) The Commission shall adopt such rules as it deems necessary or appropriate to prevent duplicative reporting pursuant to this subsection by two or more institutional investment managers exercising investment discretion with respect to the same amount.2

(7) [inserted: Disclosures by institutional investment managers in connection with proxy advisory firms.—]

(A) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: Every institutional investment manager which uses the mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in the course of its business as an institutional investment manager, which engages a proxy advisory firm, and which exercises voting power with respect to accounts holding equity securities of a class described in subsection (d)(1) or otherwise becomes or is deemed to become a beneficial owner of any security of a class described in subsection (d)(1) upon the purchase or sale of a security-based swap that the Commission may define by rule, shall file an annual report with the Commission containing—]

(i) [inserted: an explanation of how the institutional investment manager voted with respect to each shareholder proposal;]

(ii) [inserted: the percentage of votes cast on shareholder proposals that were consistent with proxy advisory firm recommendations, for each proxy advisory firm retained by the institutional investment manager;]

(iii) [inserted: an explanation of—]

(I) [inserted: how the institutional investment manager took into consideration proxy advisory firm recommendations in making voting decisions, including the degree to which the institutional investment manager used those recommendations in making voting decisions;]

(II) [inserted: how often the institutional investment manager voted consistent with a recommendation made by a proxy advisory firm, expressed as a percentage;]

(III) [inserted: how such votes are reconciled with the fiduciary duty of the institutional investment manager to vote in the best economic interests of shareholders;]

(IV) [inserted: how frequently votes were changed when an error occurred or due to new information from issuers; and]

(V) [inserted: the degree to which investment professionals of the institutional investment manager were involved in proxy voting decisions; and]

(iv) [inserted: a certification that the voting decisions of the institutional investment manager were based solely on the best economic interest of the shareholders on behalf of whom the institutional investment manager holds shares.]

(B) [inserted: Requirements for larger institutional investment managers.—] [inserted: Every institutional investment manager described in subparagraph (A) that has regulatory assets under management with an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day in any of the preceding twelve months of at least $100,000,000,000 shall—]

(i) [inserted: in any materials provided to customers and related to customers voting their shares, clarify that shareholders are not required to vote on every proposal;]

(ii) [inserted: with respect to each shareholder proposal for which the institutional investment manager votes (other than votes consistent with the recommendation of a board of directors composed of a majority of independent directors) perform an economic analysis before making such vote, to determine that the vote is in the best economic interest of the shareholders on behalf of whom the institutional investment manager holds shares; and]

(iii) [inserted: include each economic analysis required under clause (ii) in the annual report required under subparagraph (A).]

(C) [inserted: Best economic interest defined.—] [inserted: In this paragraph, the term “best economic interest” means decisions that seek to maximize investment returns over a time horizon consistent with the investment objectives and risk management profile of the fund in which shareholders are invested.]

(g) Statement of equity security ownership

(1) Any person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of any security of a class described in subsection (d)(1) of this section or otherwise becomes or is deemed to become a beneficial owner of any security of a class described in subsection (d)(1) upon the purchase or sale of a security-based swap that the Commission may define by rule shall file with the Commission a statement setting forth, in such form and at such time as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe—

Rest of § 78m unchanged ·

15 U.S.C. § 78n Proxies

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  1. Carried out:

    Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78n) is amended by adding at the end the following:(l) False or misleading statements.— For purposes of subsection (a) and Rule 14a-9 (17 CFR 240.14a-9) and any successor rule, the failure to disclose material information (such as a proxy voting advice business’s methodology, sources of information, or conflicts of interest) or …

  2. Carried out:

    Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78n), as amended by section 601, is further amended by adding at the end the following:(m) Prohibition on robovoting.— (1) In general.— The Commission shall issue final rules prohibiting the use of robovoting with respect to votes related to proxy or consent solicitation materials. (2) Robovoting defined.— In this subsection, the term “robovoting” means the …

§ 78n(k)–(o)

Start of § 78n to (k) unchanged ·

(1) Requirement The Commission shall, by rule, adopt data standards for all information contained in any proxy or consent solicitation material prepared by an issuer for an annual meeting of the shareholders of the issuer, except that the Commission may exempt exhibits, signatures, and certifications from those data standards.

(2) Consistency The data standards required under paragraph (1) shall incorporate, and ensure compatibility with (to the extent feasible), all applicable data standards established in the rules promulgated under section 5334 of title 12, including, to the extent practicable, by having the characteristics described in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection (c)(1)(B) of such section 5334.

(l) [inserted: False or misleading statements.—] [inserted: For purposes of subsection (a) and Rule 14a-9 (17 CFR 240.14a-9) and any successor rule, the failure to disclose material information (such as a proxy voting advice business’s methodology, sources of information, or conflicts of interest) or the making of a material misstatement regarding proxy voting advice that makes a recommendation to a security holder as to the security holder’s vote, consent, or authorization on a specific matter for which security holder approval is solicited, and that is furnished by a person that markets the person’s expertise as a provider of such proxy voting advice separately from other forms of investment advice, and sells such proxy voting advice for a fee, shall be considered to be false or misleading with respect to a material fact.]

(m) [inserted: Prohibition on robovoting.—]

(1) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: The Commission shall issue final rules prohibiting the use of robovoting with respect to votes related to proxy or consent solicitation materials.]

(2) [inserted: Robovoting defined.—] [inserted: In this subsection, the term “robovoting” means the practice of automatically voting in a manner consistent with the recommendations of a proxy advisory firm or on a proxy advisory firm’s electronic voting platform with the proxy advisory firm’s recommendations, in either case, without independent review and analysis.]

(n) [inserted: Prohibition on outsourcing voting decisions by institutional investors.—] [inserted: With respect to votes related to proxy or consent solicitation materials, an institutional investor may not outsource voting decisions to any person other than an investment adviser or a broker or dealer that is registered with the Commission, or is exempt from such registration, and has a fiduciary or best interest duty to the institutional investor.]

(o) [inserted: No requirement to vote.—] [inserted: No person may be required to cast votes related to proxy or consent solicitation materials, unless obligated by their fiduciary duty or Rule 206(4)–6 (17 CFR 275.206(4)–6).]

15 U.S.C. § 78q Records and reports

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  1. Carried out:

    Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78q(a)(1)) is amended by inserting proxy advisory firm, after nationally recognized statistical rating organization,.

§ 78q(a)

§ 78q. Records and reports

(a) Rules and regulations

(1) Every national securities exchange, member thereof, broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member, registered securities association, registered broker or dealer, registered municipal securities dealer municipal advisor,, registered securities information processor, registered transfer agent, nationally recognized statistical rating organization, [inserted: proxy advisory firm, ]and registered clearing agency and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board shall make and keep for prescribed periods such records, furnish such copies thereof, and make and disseminate such reports as the Commission, by rule, prescribes as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. Any report that a nationally recognized statistical rating organization is required by Commission rules under this paragraph to make and disseminate to the Commission shall be deemed furnished to the Commission.

(2) Every registered clearing agency shall also make and keep for prescribed periods such records, furnish such copies thereof, and make and disseminate such reports, as the appropriate regulatory agency for such clearing agency, by rule, prescribes as necessary or appropriate for the safeguarding of securities and funds in the custody or control of such clearing agency or for which it is responsible.

(3) Every registered transfer agent shall also make and keep for prescribed periods such rec­ords, furnish such copies thereof, and make such reports as the appropriate regulatory agency for such transfer agent, by rule, prescribes as necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of section 78q–1 of this title.

Rest of § 78q unchanged ·

15 U.S.C. § 80b–11 Rules, regulations, and orders of Commission

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  1. Carried out:

    Section 211(g) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–11(g)) is amended by adding at the end the following:(3) Best interest based on pecuniary factors.— (A) In general.— For purposes of paragraph (1), when providing personalized investment advice, the best interest of a customer shall be determined using pecuniary factors, which, subject to applicable law, may not be subordinated to …

§ 80b–11(g)–(h)

Start of § 80b–11 to (g)(2) unchanged ·

(A) receives personalized investment advice about securities from a broker, dealer, or investment adviser; and

(B) uses such advice primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(3) [inserted: Best interest based on pecuniary factors.—]

(A) [inserted: In general.—] [inserted: For purposes of paragraph (1), when providing personalized investment advice, the best interest of a customer shall be determined using pecuniary factors, which, subject to applicable law, may not be subordinated to or limited by non-pecuniary factors, unless—]

(i) [inserted: the customer provides informed consent, whether by e-delivery or e-sign, that such non-pecuniary factors be considered; or]

(ii) [inserted: the personalized investment advice is consistent with the customer’s written investment profile information.]

(B) [inserted: Disclosure of pecuniary effects.—] [inserted: If a customer provides a broker, dealer, or investment adviser with the informed consent to consider non-pecuniary factors described under subparagraph (A), the broker, dealer, or investment adviser shall provide qualitative disclosure of the potential pecuniary effects to the customer of prioritizing non-pecuniary factors over pecuniary factors in making investment decisions.]

(C) [inserted: Pecuniary factor defined.—] [inserted: In this paragraph, the term “pecuniary factor” means a factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material effect on the risk or return of an investment based on investment objectives, risk tolerance, and time horizon.]

(h) Other matters The Commission shall—

(1) facilitate the provision of simple and clear disclosures to investors regarding the terms of their relationships with brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, including any material conflicts of interest; and

Rest of § 80b–11 unchanged ·

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